

City of Chicago
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
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IN THE MATTER OF:

James K. Brown
Complainant,
v.

Tam Khuong An Nguyen and Liz Nguyen
Respondents.

Case No.: 15-H-07

Date of Ruling: January 12, 2017

FINAL RULING ON LIABILITY AND RELIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2015, Complainant filed a complaint of housing discrimination based upon race and source of income with the Commission on Human Relations, in violation of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, Chapter 5-8 of the Chicago Municipal Code. On April 21, 2015, the Commission issued Respondent Liz Nguyen an Order to Respond and Notice of Potential Default. On May 18, 2015, Attorney Ninh Ma filed his appearance with the Commission and filed an Answer to the Complaint on behalf of Respondents Tam Khuong An Nguyen and Liz Nguyen. No withdrawal of that appearance has ever been filed.

On May 22, 2015, the Commission issued a Second Order to Respond and Notice of Potential Default. The Order was sent to Respondents and to their attorney. On June 9, 2015, a Verified Amended Answer and Position Statement were filed on behalf of Respondents by their attorney.

On December 31, 2015, an Order Finding Substantial Evidence was entered by the Commission and sent to Respondents' attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled for February 24, 2016. Respondents did not appear and did not seek a continuance pursuant to Commission Regulation 210.320(b). As a result, on March 4, 2016, a Notice of Potential Default and Other Sanctions for Failure to Attend Settlement Conference was issued to Respondents. On March 14, 2016, Respondents' attorney submitted a response stating that he was unable to attend the conference due to illness. On April 4, 2016, the Commission entered an Order of Default against Respondents finding that the explanation did not constitute good cause for failure to attend the settlement conference and ordering attorney Ninh Ma to pay a fine of \$70. On April 11, 2016, Respondents, through their attorney, filed a Motion to Vacate the Default. The Commission entered an Order denying Respondents' motion on April 14, 2016.

The Order of Default means that Respondents are deemed to have admitted the allegations of the Complaint and to have waived any defenses to the allegations including defenses concerning the Complaint's sufficiency. As further set forth in Commission Regulation 235.320, an administrative hearing is held only to allow Complainant to establish a *prima facie* case and to establish the nature and amount of relief to be awarded. Complainant could rely on his Complaint to establish his *prima facie* case or present additional evidence. Respondents were notified that they could not contest the sufficiency of the complaint or present any evidence in

defense, but could present evidence as to whether the relief sought by Complainant was reasonable and supported by the evidence provided by Complainant.

On May 26, 2016, the Order Appointing Hearing Officer and Commencing the Hearing Process was entered. A pre-hearing conference was scheduled on June 27, 2016. Neither Respondents nor their attorney appeared at the pre-hearing conference. An initial scheduling order was entered by the hearing officer, and sent to all parties. Respondents and their attorney ignored that order and have not participated further in this proceeding.

An administrative hearing was held on August 10, 2016. Complainant appeared at the hearing along with his attorney. At the commencement of the hearing, but before testimony was taken, Complainant's attorney represented that he had spoken to attorney Ninh Ma the night before and informed Ma that the hearing was going forward the next day. Ma stated that he would be present at the hearing the next day; however, he never appeared and never contacted the Commission.

On October 31, 2016, the hearing officer issued his Recommended Ruling on Liability and Relief. Respondents filed objections to the Recommended Ruling, which were considered in reaching this Final Ruling.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Complainant James Kevin Brown is an African-American resident of the City of Chicago. Complainant is a military veteran who spent fifteen years serving in the United States Army before being honorably discharged. Tr. 10.¹ As a result of his service, Complainant has a disability and receives a disability pension from the Army. In addition, Complainant possesses a Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Certificate (VASH) issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, described by Complainant as "Section 8 for Veterans."

2. Complainant has sole custody of his 11-year-old son, Devin, with whom he lives. At the time of the incidents giving rise to this Complaint, Devin attended a Chicago Public School that was one-half block away from 4917 North Kostner, the home offered for rent by Respondents.

3. Around the beginning of March 2015, Complainant, who had been having difficulties with his present landlord entering his apartment without his permission, began looking for another dwelling to rent for him and his son. Tr. 14. Ideally, Complainant wanted a place to live that would be spacious and close to his son's school.

4. On March 6, 2015, Complainant observed a "For Rent" sign in Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen's house, located at 4917 North Kostner, Chicago, IL. The house was a two-story bungalow located just one-half block from Devin's school. Tr. 15.

5. Complainant marked down the telephone number that was on the sign and called it when he returned home. He spoke with a woman, later identified as Mrs. Nguyen, who indicated that she owned the house and scheduled an appointment for Complainant to see it. Complainant was shown the house by a man who spoke little or no English. Complainant loved the home. It had been totally remodeled.

¹ All references to the transcript of the hearing will be "Tr. "

6. The person who showed Complainant the home told Complainant that he had to “call the number,” meaning the telephone number Complainant had initially called.

7. Complainant called Mrs. Nguyen and spoke with her. Complainant told her that he wanted to rent the house and mentioned that he would be using “Section 8 through the military” to help pay the rent. She said, “Yeah, no problem.” Tr. 17. They arranged to meet that evening at the house. Mrs. Nguyen told Complainant that she would first call him after she got off of work.

8. Complainant was concerned that it would be too dark to meet in the evening, so he tried calling Mrs. Nguyen several times during the day. Every time he called, the phone would ring but no one would answer. Tr. 18.

9. Finally, that afternoon Complainant used his son’s phone to call Mrs. Nguyen, and she immediately answered. Complainant identified himself and told her that he was calling about the house on Kostner. She told Complainant, “Oh, my husband said it has been rented.” Complainant told her he was sorry to hear that.

10. The next day when Complainant took his son to school, he saw that the “For Rent” sign was still in the window of that house. That whole week when Complainant walked by the house, he noticed the “For Rent” sign. He even took pictures of it. Tr. 18. So, Complainant again called Ms. Nguyen and again was told that the house had been rented. Tr. 19.

11. Shortly thereafter, Complainant’s landlord, Ms. Kim, with Complainant standing next to her, called the same number and spoke to Mrs. Nguyen. She asked Mrs. Nguyen if the place was still available, and if she and her husband could view the house. Mrs. Nguyen said, “Yes,” and offered to make an appointment. Tr. 19.

12. Had Complainant been allowed to rent Respondents’ home, his daily walk with his son to school would have taken between two and three minutes. At Complainant’s current apartment, it takes 15 to 20 minutes to walk his son to school. Tr. 31.

13. Each day when Complainant walks his son to school, he walks past Respondents’ home. Complainant testified that when he walks past the home, he thinks of what could have been and it “irks” him. Complainant thinks that his son could have had a puppy, which he wanted, since the home had an enclosed yard. Tr. 37.

14. After he was falsely told that Respondents’ house had been rented, Complainant continued to search for a suitable dwelling. This search continued until August 2015. Tr. 39. He ended up renting an apartment at 4111 West Lawrence for \$1,600 per month. Because Complainant receives a housing voucher, the amount of rent Complainant pays each month is the same amount he would have paid had he rented Respondents’ home, since his portion of the rent is based on his income. Tr. 41-42.

15. Instead of the single family home that Complainant was seeking, he ended up renting a second floor apartment on a busy street with a rodent problem in the alley behind the building. Tr. 35-36.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations has proper jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter of this controversy.

2. Under Commission Regulation 235.320, Respondents are deemed to have admitted the allegations of Complainant's Complaint and to have waived any defenses to the allegations, including defenses concerning the Complaint's sufficiency. The administrative hearing was held to allow Complainant, through his Complaint and other evidence, to establish a *prima facie* case and to establish the nature and amount of relief to be awarded. *Hall v. Woodgett*, CCHR No. 13-H-51 (Nov. 5, 2015).

3. Complainant was discriminated against by Respondents on the basis of his race and his source of income in violation of § 5-8-020 of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, when Respondents misrepresented the availability of housing and refused to rent to Complainant.

IV. DISCUSSION

To establish a *prima facie* case of housing discrimination, Complainant must show that he (1) belongs to a protected class; and (2) was denied the opportunity to rent or own housing that was available; or (3) was offered housing on terms different from the offers made to others. *Shipp v. Wagner*, CCHR No. 12-H-19 (July 16, 2014). Complainant has met his burden with the allegations of his Complaint along with Complainant's testimony at the hearing. Complainant is African-American and was seeking to rent a home using a VASH Certificate. He was told that the home had been rented while a subsequent caller, Complainant's Asian landlord, was told it remained available. In this case, the Complainant has gone well beyond establishing a *prima facie* case of discrimination. The uncontested facts testified to at the hearing establish that Complainant was denied the ability to rent an available home because of his race and source of income.

In their objections, Respondents' attorney argues that the Order of Default entered by the Commission should be vacated because Respondents actively participated during the Commission's investigation. Additionally, Respondents' attorney further argues that he provided correspondence to the Commission immediately after failing to attend the settlement conference that was scheduled in this matter. Pursuant to Commission Regulation 235.150 (a), any motion to vacate or modify a sanction must be filed no later than 28 days from the mailing of the order imposing the sanction. The Order of Default was entered on April 4, 2016. Respondents submitted a timely motion to vacate. The same arguments raised by Respondents in their objections were considered and subsequently ruled upon by the Commission in the Order Denying Motion to Vacate entered on April 14, 2016.

Because a default judgment was entered against Respondents, Complainant need only establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination to prevail on his claims. Here, Complainant's testimony, along with the admitted allegations of his Complaint, establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination. Respondents are therefore liable for violation of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance.

V. REMEDIES

Upon determining that a violation of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance or the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance has occurred, the Commission may award relief as set forth in Section 2-120-510(l) of the Chicago Municipal Code:

[T]o order such relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances determined in the hearing. Relief may include but is not limited to an order: to cease the illegal conduct complained of; to pay actual damages, as reasonably determined by the Commission, for injury or loss suffered by the complainant; to hire, reinstate or upgrade the complainant with or without back pay or to provide such fringe benefits as the complainant may have been denied; to admit the complainant to a public accommodation; to extend to the complainant the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of the respondent; to pay to the complainant all or a portion of the costs, including reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, witness fees and duplicating costs incurred in pursuing the complaint before the commission or at any stage of judicial review; to take such action as may be necessary to make the individual complainant whole, including, but not limited to, awards of interest on the complainant's actual damages and back pay from the date of the civil rights violation. These remedies shall be cumulative, and in addition to any fines imposed for violation of provisions of Chapter 2-160 and Chapter 5-8.

A. Emotional Distress Damages

It is well established that the compensatory damages which may be awarded by the Commission may include damages for the embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress caused by the discrimination. *Nash & Demby v. Sallas Realty et al.*, CCHR No. 92-H-128, (May 17, 1995), citing *Gould v. Rozdilsky*, CCHR No. 92-FHO-25-5610 (May 4, 1992). Such damages may be inferred from the circumstances of the case as well as proved by testimony. *Id.*; see also *Campbell v. Brown and Dearborn Parkway*, CCHR No. 92-FHO-18-5630 (Dec. 16, 1992); *Hoskins v. Campbell*, CCHR No. 01-H-101 (Apr. 6, 2003); *Marable v. Walker*, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983); and *Gore v. Turner*, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977).

While it may be difficult to place a dollar value on a complainant's emotional suffering that results from a discriminatory act, neither expert testimony nor medical evidence is necessary to establish such damages. *Nash & Demby, supra*; *Ordon v. Al-Rahman Animal Hospital*, CCHR No. 92-E-139, at 14-15 (July 23, 1993); *Hanson v. Association of Volleyball Professionals*, CCHR No. 97-PA-62, at 11 (Oct. 21, 1998). A complainant's testimony standing alone may be sufficient to establish that he or she suffered compensable distress. *Diaz v. Wykurz et al.*, CCHR No. 07-H-28 (Dec. 16, 2009); *Craig v. New Crystal Restaurant*, CCHR No. 92-PA-40 (Oct. 18, 1995).

The amount of the award for emotional distress depends on several factors, including but not limited to the vulnerability of the complainant, the egregiousness of the discrimination, the severity of the mental distress, whether it was accompanied by physical manifestations and/or medical or psychiatric treatment, the duration of the discriminatory conduct, and the effect of the distress. The Commission has recognized the intangible benefits of seeking a more favorable environment for one's children and the damages that result when that becomes unobtainable as a result of discriminatory conduct. *Hall, supra*. See also, *Buckner v. Verbon*, CCHR No. 94-H-82 (May 21, 1997) (Complainant was upset because his family was forced to live in a dangerous,

high-crime neighborhood longer than he anticipated); *Novak Padlan*, CCHR No. 96-H-133 (Nov. 19, 1997) (Complainant's new residence was in a much less desirable neighborhood than that in which the respondent's apartment was located).

Humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by testimony. *Campbell v. Brown/Dearborn Parkway*, CCHR No. 92-FHO-18-5630 (Dec. 16, 1992); *Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc.*, 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974); *Crumble v. Blumthal*, 549 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977).

The hearing officer noted that it was clear from Complainant's testimony that he was gravely injured by Respondents' actions. After serving his country in the Armed Forces and developing a disability as a result, Complainant found himself unable to obtain what he described as "a beautiful home," freshly painted, close to his son's school, and with a yard so that he could provide his son with the puppy he wanted.

The severity of the discriminatory act, telling Complainant that the house had been rented, when in fact it had not, though unaccompanied by racially hostile remarks or actions, was nonetheless, tantamount to having a door slammed shut in your face. The duration of the emotional injury is far from a one-time event. Complainant testified that every day when he walks his son to school, he is reminded of the treatment he received:

It's like, man, we could have had that, we could have been living right there, and you could have got a dog, you know, because they had a backyard. He wanted a puppy. Living in an apartment you really can't do that. He said, well, we will just keep trying and I said, yeah, we will, and that's it. Tr. 37.

Complainant's new living environment is much less favorable than the home he could have rented. It is an apartment, rather than a single family home. The apartment is on a busy street, and there are rats "as big as your shoe" behind the home. Tr. 36. Also, there is a 20 minute walk to school, as opposed to a two minute walk.

There was no testimony regarding any physical manifestations of the emotional injury or any medical or psychiatric treatment. This factor was considered by the hearing officer with regard to the assessment of appropriate damages.

Here, Complainant is seeking an award of \$15,000 in emotional distress damages as was awarded in *Sercye v. Reppen and Wilson*, CCHR No. 08-H-42 (Oct. 21, 2009). While the facts of *Sercye* are similar to the instant case, the complainant in *Sercye* specifically testified to her feelings of hopelessness and the shame she felt as she had to tell her daughter that they had to "keep on looking." The hearing officer determined that this level of testimony was lacking in Complainant's testimony. Though the acts complained of would be expected to cause considerable emotional distress, the harm must be articulated with some level of specificity to support a significant award for emotional distress damages.

In *Montelongo v. Azapira*, CCHR No. 09-H-23 (Feb. 15, 2012), the Commission approved an award of emotional distress damages in the amount of \$2,500 to a complainant who testified that she had to move to another neighborhood farther away from the affordable childcare resource she had arranged. She also testified that she had to move to another neighborhood where she did not feel safe. However, there was no daily reminder of the discriminatory conduct.

Respondents argue in their objections, that the facts of this case are similar to those in *Hoskins v. Campbell*, CCHR No. 01-H-101(Apr. 16, 2003). In *Hoskins*, the Commission awarded \$750 in emotional distress damages finding that the respondent's failure to rent to the complainant because of her Section 8 voucher was not particularly egregious because it involved a single brief action, without face-to-face contact, and had no clearly linked medical consequences. Respondents contend that an appropriate award for emotional distress damages in this matter is \$750. The Commission disagrees.

The hearing officer remarked that Complainant's observed emotional pain was palpable. When Complainant testified about the daily reminder of his denial of housing, and when Complainant testified about his inability to provide his son with a true home, with a yard, Complainant's voice cracked and the emotional effect of the act which took place more than 18 months prior to the hearing seemed as if it had just occurred. Given this testimony, the hearing officer determined that Complainant's emotional distress substantially exceeds that of the complainant in *Montelongo* and recommended an award of \$10,000 in emotional distress damages. The Commission approves and adopts this recommendation.

B. Punitive Damages

The Commission awards punitive damages to punish discriminatory conduct and deter such conduct in the future. *Nash & Demby v. Sallas Realty & Sallas*, CCHR No. 92-H-128 (Apr. 19, 2000). Significant punitive damages awards have been ordered by the Commission when the respondent's conduct was willful and wanton, or was in reckless disregard or callous indifference to the complainant's rights. *Salwierak v. MRI of Chicago, Inc., et al.*, CCHR No. 99-E-107 (July 16, 2003). Punitive damages are appropriate to punish. *McCall v. Cook County Sheriff's Office*, CCHR No. 92-E-122 (Dec. 21, 1994). Any efforts by a respondent to cover up its misconduct may be considered in deciding whether to award such damages. *Huff v. American Mgmt. & Rental Service*, CCHR No. 97-H-187 (Jan. 20, 1999), and punitive damages should be granted where there is proof of egregious conduct such as callous indifference to protected rights or perjured testimony at the administrative hearing. *Id.*; *Collins and Ali v. Magdenovski*, CCHR No. 91-FHO-70-5655 (Sept. 16, 1992).

The prospect of punitive damages being awarded for egregious violations of protected rights has played a critical role in the enforcement of civil rights statutes and thus, society's efforts to establish normative values of conduct in the workplace. Merely requiring a respondent to henceforth comply with the law and to make a victim of discrimination "whole," after the damage has been done, minimizes the seriousness of the offense.

The Commission agrees with the hearing officer that this case is an appropriate one to order a significant punitive damages award given that Respondents' conduct was clearly intentional. Not only did Mrs. Nguyen misrepresent the availability of her rental home, but she affirmatively attempted to ignore Complainant's telephone calls. It was only when Complainant used his son's phone that she answered it.

Housing discrimination of any type is a pernicious assault on an individual's dignity as well as on societal values. Magnifying the egregiousness of Respondents' conduct is the contempt that Respondents showed for the administrative process by refusing to participate. The Commission has held that while disregarding the Commission's procedures should not be the sole basis for an award of punitive damages, it is a factor to be considered. *Flores v. A Taste Of Heaven et al.*, CCHR No. 06-E-32 (Aug. 18, 2010).

The Commission also agrees with the hearing officer that the conduct of Respondents was willful and malicious, meriting an award of punitive damages. The fact that in blatantly discriminating against Complainant, Respondents may have treated him “politely” does not mean that their actions were not malicious. See, *City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc.*, 982 F.2d 1086, 1099–1100 (7th Cir. 1992)(Although four real estate agents may have been courteous to the testers, their behavior demonstrated that they actively discriminated against the black testers because of their race. The law does not tolerate this behavior and punitive damages are an appropriate remedy when real estate agents engage in blatantly obvious racial discrimination.) Unless an award of punitive damages is entered, Respondents’ conduct may be repeated resulting in injury to others.

Complainant requested an award of \$15,000 in punitive damages, equal to what he requested in compensatory damages. Respondents argue that an appropriate award for punitive damages is \$250, citing the decision in *Hoskins, supra*.

As noted in *Rankin v. 6954 N. Sheridan, Inc., DLG Management, et al.*, CCHR No. 08-H-49 (Aug. 18, 2010), awards of punitive damages by the Commission in source of income discrimination cases have ranged from \$250 to \$5,000 to “deliver the message about providing equal rental opportunities to Section 8 voucher holders.” *Rankin, supra* at 20. However, the Commission has made higher awards of punitive damages when the complainant was deprived of a housing opportunity as a result of the discriminatory conduct. For example, in *Soria v. Kern*, CCHR No. 95-H-13 (July 17, 1996), \$10,000 in punitive damages was ordered where a defaulted respondent had explicitly refused to rent to a complainant because of her race and completely disregarded Commission procedures. Similarly, in *Buckner v. Verbon*, CCHR No. 94-H-82 (May 21, 1997), \$10,000 in punitive damages was ordered where a landlord explicitly refused to rent to a prospective tenant upon learning her race.

In *Figueroa v. Fell*, CCHR No. 97-H-5 (Oct. 21, 1998), the Commission ordered \$35,000 in punitive damages where a landlord explicitly and persistently created a hostile housing environment based on a complainant’s Hispanic ancestry. In addition, the respondent and his attorney exhibited extreme disrespect and disregard for the Commission’s adjudication process. The Commission found that a sizeable award was needed to deter future violations.

In consideration of the totality of Respondents’ conduct toward Complainant, and of their inadequate participation in proceedings before the Commission, the Commission agrees with the hearing officer’s recommendation and finds that an award of punitive damages in the amount of \$15,000 is appropriate.

C. Attorney Fees

Section 2-120-510(l) of the Chicago Municipal Code allows the Commission to order a respondent to pay a prevailing complainant’s reasonable attorney fees and associated costs. Indeed, the Commission has routinely found that prevailing complainants are entitled to such an order. See, e.g., *Hall v. Becovic*, CCHR No. 94-H-39 (Jan. 10, 1996), *aff’d Becovic v. City of Chicago et al.*, 296 Ill. App. 3d 236, 694 N.E.2d 1044 (1st Dist. 1998); *Soria v. Kern, supra* at 19. The Commission adopts the hearing officer’s recommendation and awards Complainant’s reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Pursuant to Commission Regulation 240.630, Complainant may serve and file a petition for attorney’s fees and/or costs, supported by arguments and affidavits, no later than 28 days

from the mailing of this Final Ruling on Liability and Relief. The supporting documentation shall include the following:

1. A statement showing the number of hours for which compensation is sought in segments of no more than one-quarter hour, itemized according to the date performed, the work performed, and the individual who performed the work;
2. A statement of the hourly rate customarily charged by each individual for whom compensation is sought;
3. Documentation of costs for which reimbursement is sought.

D. Interest on Damages

Section 2-120-510(I), Chicago Municipal Code, allows an additional award of interest on damages ordered to remedy violations of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance or the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance. Pursuant to CCHR Reg. 240.700, the Commission routinely awards interest at the prime rate, adjusted quarterly from the date of violation, and compounded annually. The hearing officer recommended that the Commission award interest on all damages awarded in this case starting from the date of the violation. Accordingly, the Commission orders payment of interest on the damages from the date of the violation, March 6, 2015.

E. Fine

Section 5-8-130 of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance provides that any covered party found in violation shall be punished by a fine not exceeding \$1,000 per violation. Respondents have been found to have violated the Ordinance. The hearing officer recommended the maximum fine against Respondents. Effective December 21, 2013, the maximum fine allowed for violations of the Ordinance is \$1,000. In view of the egregiousness of the violation, the Commission agrees with the recommendation to impose the maximum fine against Respondents, and so imposes a fine of \$1,000.

F. Other Relief

Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct state that “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Respondents’ attorney, Ninh Ma, after filing his appearance before the Commission, abandoned the proceedings without ever filing a motion to withdraw his appearance and with no explanation to the hearing officer. He ignored repeated procedural orders of the hearing officer and then, after informing Complainant’s counsel that he would appear at the administrative hearing, did not. Such conduct is disruptive of the administrative process and interferes with the administration of justice. The hearing officer recommended that this final ruling be forwarded to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for investigation. The Commission agrees with the recommendation and will forward a copy of this ruling.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Commission finds Respondents Tam Khuong An Nguyen and Liz Nguyen liable for race and source of income discrimination in violation of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance and orders the following relief:

1. Payment to the City of Chicago of a fine of \$1,000;
2. Payment to Complainant of emotional distress damages in the amount of \$10,000 and punitive damages of \$15,000, for a total damages of \$25,000;
3. Payment of interest on the foregoing damages from the date of violation on March 6, 2015;
4. Respondents jointly and severally are ordered to pay Complainant's reasonable attorney fees and costs as determined by further order of the Commission pursuant to the procedures outlined above.

CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

Mona Noriega

By: Mona Noriega, Chair and Commissioner
Entered: January 12, 2017